29 June 1945

29 June 1945

29 June 1945




The Soviet Union seizes Ruthenia

29 June 1945 - History

screenplay written by Peter Benchley & Carl Gottlieb / Indianapolis speech written by uncredited writers Howard Sackler, John Milius, and Robert Shaw

Thanks to "The Major", Michael, Francis, and Dave for corrections.

From text on the IMDB's trivia page for "Jaws": Quint's tale of the USS Indianapolis was conceived by playwright Howard Sackler, lengthened by screenwriter John Milius and rewritten by Robert Shaw following a disagreement between screenwriters Peter Benchley and Carl Gottlieb. Shaw presented his text, and Benchley and Gottlieb agreed that this was exactly what was needed. Whoever was responsible, Quint got the date of the sinking wrong, claiming it was June 29, 1945, when in reality it was 12:14 am on July 30th, 1945. Universal has toyed with the idea of making the "Indianapolis" incident into a film, using a young Quint as the lead, ever since. Note that June 29, however, is the date (in the film) that the young boy was eaten by the shark, as can be seen in the hand-written "reward" notice.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea

The Battle of the Philippine Sea took place between June 19th and June 20th, 1944. This battle was said to be the last great carrier battle of World War Two. The Battle of Midway in 1942 had done a great deal to damage Japan’s carrier force, but even into 1944, Japan statistically had a larger carrier force than America. Despite America’s huge military capability, the Japanese Navy still represented a threat to her – especially in America’s desire to advance to the Marianas.

In November 1943, America launched the start of a major assault through the Central Pacific and at the heart of the Japanese defence system. This started with the assault on the Gilbert Islands and moved, in February 1944, to the main atolls of the Marshall Islands. The ferocity of the American attack forced the Japanese to move their fleet to Singapore. As the Americans moved relentlessly east through the Central Pacific, the Japanese came to the conclusion that only a major sea battle with America would redress the balance at sea. Without control of the sea, the Japanese believed, the Americans could no longer maintain their advance as all their successes had been amphibious based. Without control of the sea, the Americans could not longer move her troops to shore.

The next stage in the American campaign was an attack on the Marianas, which was scheduled for June 1944. The Northern Attack Force, led by Vice-Admiral Richmond Turner, was assembled at Hawaii in readiness to attack Saipan. The Southern Attack Force, commanded by Rear-Admiral R L Conolly assembled at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in preparation for an attack on Guam. There were 71,000 assault troops in the Northern Force and 56,000 in the Southern a combined total of 127,000.

The Japanese had planned for an attack on the Marianas with ‘Operation A-Go’. Her Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Toyoda, had developed a complex plan to lure the American fleet to either the Palau’s or the Western Carolinas. Once in either region, America’s ships would be in range of Japan’s land based air force. Toyoda envisaged that they would finish off America’s naval power in the Central Pacific. So what would entice the Americans to where the Japanese wanted to get them? Toyoda decided that part of his fleet would be used to lure the Americans to either the Palau’s or the Western Carolinas. Little attempt would be made to conceal the movement of the Japanese force that was to be the bait – a force commanded by Vice-Admiral Ozawa.

The Japanese gathered 1,700 planes at their shore bases in Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and New Guinea. More than 500 planes were based on Tinian, Guam and Saipan in the Marianas. Toyoda planned that the planes would attack whatever fleet America sent and damage it so badly that the second phase, a naval battle, could only result in a Japanese victory.

While the Northern and Southern forces were in training, America continued its advance led by Douglas MacArthur. In March, 1944, MacArthur attacked Hollandia in New Guinea. In this assault, he was assisted by Task Force 58 – a massive carrier component of the 5th Fleet. Planes from the carriers also attacked Truk that had a Japanese air base on it, and various other targets – all of which allowed the American pilots to keep their skills honed.

The attack on Saipan was scheduled for June 15th and the two forces, Northern and Southern, moved to their forward bases at Eniwetok and Kwajalein respectively. The invasion fleet was protected by a vast force – 7 battleships, 12 escort carriers, 11 cruisers and 91 destroyers or destroyer escorts. Task Force 58 had already started to soften up targets on Saipan on June 11th. Task Force 58 was commanded by Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher who flew his flag on the ‘USS Lexington’. The Americans had planned for air superiority over Saipan before the assault took place. Over 200 Hellcat fighters from Mitscher’s carriers attacked Japanese positions on the island on a regular basis.

The ships in Task Force 58 were divided into four battle groups.

  1. TG58-1 with the carriers Hornet and Yorktown had 265 aircraft in it.
  2. TG58-2 was led by the carrier Bunker Hill and had 242 planes at its disposal.
  3. TG58-3 had the carriers Enterprise and Lexington in it and could call on 227 aircraft.
  4. TG58-4 was led by the carrier Essex and had 162 aircraft in it.

Each battle group was protected by battleships and cruisers. In all, Task Force 58 could call on 896 planes – nearly all were the Grumman F6F Hellcat – a plane with a deserved reputation in combat. Such was the improvement in communications since the Battle of Coral Sea in 1942, that each battle group could operate on its own very effectively but could support any other one (or fight as a complete unit) when required to do so.

By the evening of June 13th, the planes from Task Force 58 had gained air superiority over the Japanese in Saipan and Tinian. On the same day, 16-inch and 14 –inch guns from American battleships pounded targets on the shoreline.

Toyoda had placed a great deal of faith in the 500 Japanese planes based on the Marianas. They had now been destroyed or had moved out of the battle zone. This was a serious blow to the Japanese – and one that they failed to inform Ozawa of as he attempted to ‘lure’ out the Americans. On June 13th, Toyoda gave the go-ahead for ‘Operation A-Go’ to start.

On June 15th, American forces landed at Saipan – the Northern Force. Therefore, the coming naval battle was to be in the vicinity of Saipan. The Japanese ordered more ships to the region to support Ozawa – including the battleships Yamato and Musashi. They were accompanied by two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and three destroyers. It seems that at this point any intention to lure the Americans to a specific spot was dropped and that a simple full-scale sea battle was envisaged. All the Japanese ships met together on June 16th. The following message was sent to every Japanese ship:

“The fate of the Empire rests on this one battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost.”

However, American submarines had tracked both parts that made up the Japanese fleet – and informed Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the 5th Fleet, accordingly. He had to offer sea protection to the troops on Saipan even though his instinct was to sail to the enemy and meet them away from Saipan itself. Knowing that such a move would be risky as there was always the chance that he would lose the battle, Spruance decided to wait for the Japanese to move towards his fleet.

Intelligence had informed Spruance that the Japanese would not reach the area where the Americans were until June 19th. During the time that this took, Spruance organised his force so that it was 180 west of Tinian. Seven battleships were taken from task groups 58-1 and 58-4 to form a battleship force supported by four heavy cruisers and thirteen destroyers. The primary task of this awesome force was to stop the Japanese getting near the American aircraft carriers. The planes from task group 58-4 were used to give the battleship group air cover.

On June 18th, the American submarine ‘Cavalla’ spotted the Japanese fleet 780 miles to the west of Saipan. As it approached the Americans, the Japanese split the fleet in three:

A Force had three large carriers attached to it and could muster 430 planes

B Force had two carriers and one light carrier in it and had 135 planes in it.

C Force had three light carriers in it and had 88 aircraft in it.

C Force was kept 100 miles from the other two forces, in the hope that the Americans would concentrate their resources on this force as a large number of ships were attached to it including four battleships and five cruisers. In this way, Ozama hoped that the carriers in A and B would not be the main target of America.

However, there was a delay in intelligence reaching Spruance and not even land based airplanes could find the Japanese fleet despite the information given by the ‘Cavalla’. So at this vital moment, Spruance was short of vital information. The same was not true for the Japanese. They launched sea planes from their large warships and the whereabouts of Task Force 58 was soon known. The Japanese held the advantage as there was 400 miles between them and the American fleet. Japanese carrier-launched planes could attack the Americans but the American planes did not have this distance in them.

Scouting seaplanes gave Ozawa the information he needed and at 08.30 he ordered an attack. Forty-five Zero fighter-bombers, eight torpedo bombers and 16 Zero fighters were launched from C Force. A Force sent out a force of 128 planes and B Force launched 47 planes. In just one hour, the Japanese sent out 244 planes.

However, Ozawa’s plan suffered a series of setbacks from the start. The US submarine ‘Albacore’ attacked the carrier ‘Taiho’. The carrier continued to operate but the simple fact that it had been hit by a torpedo salvo undermined confidence. Also the strike force of Japanese planes attacked ships from C Force – Japanese ships that were sailing in advance of the main bulk of C Force. The ships fired back and two planes were shot down and eight had to return to their carrier for repairs. Such an occurrence was symptomatic of how the rest of the battle would go – the so-called ‘Great Marianas Turkey Shoot’.

Spruance had sent up Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters at dawn to give his fleet aerial cover. At 10.00 on June 19th, American radar picked up a very large swarm of Japanese planes approaching. More planes were launched from the American carrier force – 300 in all.

The American planes intercepted the Japanese between 45 and 60 miles from the American fleet. Many Japanese planes were shot down. Japan had lost many experienced naval pilots at Coral Sea and Midway and this experience had never been fully replaced. Many who fought in this battle had not finished their training, and paid the price.

In the first Japanese strike, 42 planes were shot down out of a total of 69, an attrition rate of 61%. In Europe, Bomber Command and the USAAF deemed a bomber loss of 5% as being unacceptable. From the second strike, out of 128 planes, about 20 got through the US fighter cover but hit the massed guns of American battleships, cruisers and destroyers. A few got passed the battleship line and attacked the carriers. Only minor damage was done to the ‘Bunker Hill’ and ‘Wasp’. Out of the 128 planes that attacked this time, only 30 returned.

Along with these losses, Ozama suffered another when the carrier ‘Shokaku’ was sunk by the submarine USS Cavalla. This carrier had been in on the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, so her loss did a lot to lower morale. The ‘Taiho’, hit by an earlier torpedo attack, also went down when fumes from ruptured petrol tanks were ignited and tore open the hull of the carrier.

The second air strike by the Japanese was also a failure. Some failed to find a target. Those that did had to cope with the Hellcats protecting the fleet.

Another air fleet attacked from the carriers of Forces A and B. This attack involved 87 planes. They had been ordered to land in Guam after the attack without knowing that the runways there had been badly damaged. Also at Guam they flew into another defence force of Hellcats and 30 were shot down. Only 19 planes out of the 87 got to any base – be it carrier or land.

The Japanese tried to land more planes at Guam or Rota from air forces elsewhere, but many were shot down by the Americans before they could land. In all, the Japanese had launched 373 planes from its carriers and only 130 returned – nearly a two-thirds rate of loss. Only 102 were serviceable to any degree. Only 29 Americans planes were destroyed.

A carrier fleet without planes was useless. The Battle of the Philippine Sea effectively spelt the end of whatever carrier strength the Japanese Navy had.

However, Ozawa was never fully aware of what had happened to his plane force carried by his carriers. Those pilots that had returned had brought back stories of four American carriers being sunk and many US planes destroyed! He prepared to continue the battle.

However, he was never given the chance. At 16.30, 77 dive-bombers, 54 torpedo-planes and 85 fighters took off from American carriers to attack the Japanese fleet. Ozawa had very few planes with which to fight back and his losses were severe. The carriers ‘Hiyo’, ‘Zuikaku’ and ‘Chiyoda’ were hit. The battleship ‘Haruna’ was also hit. The Japanese lost a further 65 planes and by the end of the attack, Ozama’s fleet only had 35 planes left. The total American loss in this attack was 14 planes. Ozama realised that he had no hope of continuing the fight and signaled Toyoda that he was retreating to Okinawa. He had lost 375 planes in total.

The problem the Americans now experienced was getting back to the carriers as darkness was falling and few pilots were trained to land in the dark. The carriers broke all the rules imaginable by essentially flood lighting themselves so that the returning pilots had as good a view of the deck as was possible. Luckily no carrier fell prey to Japanese submarines despite illuminating themselves. The Americans lost 80 planes that either crashed into the deck or went over the side. However, as a result of a massive rescue operation only 16 pilots and 33 aircrew remained missing by first light on June 20th.

The Japanese still had carriers but very few planes to operate on them. More important, they had few aircrew who had any degree of experience. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was an overwhelming victory for the Americans. The next major concern they had at sea were the kamikazes.

"Countdown 1945": The story of the first use of the atomic bomb

As the anchor of "Fox News Sunday," Chris Wallace has been at the center of the cultural and political wars swirling around President Trump. So, his new book seems to come out of nowhere. "One of the things I love the most about researching this book and writing this book is it has nothing to do with Donald Trump," Wallace said.

"Countdown 1945," published by Simon & Schuster (a ViacomCBS company), tells the dramatic story of the 116 days from Harry Truman's sudden and unexpected swearing-in as president to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

"It was the biggest decision maybe any president has ever made," Wallace said.

Chris Wallace discusses "Countdown 1945." CBS News

Vice President Truman had been presiding over a dreary Senate debate when he was called to the White House: "Eleanor Roosevelt is dressed in black, and she says, 'Harry, the president is dead.' And he says, 'Mrs. Roosevelt, is there anything we can do for you?' And Eleanor Roosevelt says, 'Harry, is there anything we can do for you? Because you're the one in trouble now.'"

Truman and the cabinet looked stunned at his swearing-in. "I felt like the moon, the stars and all the planets had fallen on me," he said. Then, Secretary of War Henry Stimson pulled him aside, to inform him of "a top-secret project of immense importance" to create the most powerful bomb ever built.

Truman had been vice president for only three months, and knew nothing about the Manhattan Project and the race to build the atomic bomb.

"This is the original weapon of mass destruction," said national security correspondent David Martin.

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"Absolutely," Wallace said. "The world had never seen anything like this."

The military was busy planning the invasion of Japan, an operation Gen. George Marshall estimated would require 700,000 troops, take a year, and cost tens of thousands of American casualties. The bomb had not yet been tested.

Physicist Norris Bradbury, who later became Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, is shown with the partially-assembled Trinity device (the "gadget") at Alamogordo, N.M. in July 1945. Manhattan Project National Historical Park

Wallace said, "Truman had no idea whether it was going to work, and he basically said, 'It's a science project until you can convince me that this is actually a weapon,' which doesn't happen until July 16."

On that morning at Alamogordo, New Mexico, the scientists who had designed and built what they called "the gadget" were ready.

"At 5:30, this pulse goes to the bomb, which is up on a 100-foot tower," Wallace said. "And something happens that has never happened in the history of the world before."

This is what it looked like:

"This enormous mushroom cloud billows 40,000 feet into the air," said Wallace. "The 100-foot steel tower is vaporized. And every living thing, from antelope to blades of grass, were vaporized."

President Truman was in Potsdam, Germany, for his first meeting with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin.

"He now realizes this isn't a science project anymore he's got the most powerful weapon ever imagined by man," Wallace said.

"The president has at his disposal a weapon that can destroy a city," said Martin. "Now you've got to choose a city. How was that done?"

"They wanted a major city that had largely been untouched, that had a military impact, and that had the topography that would augment and magnify the explosiveness of the bomb so it would have as dramatic a military and psychological impact as possible," Wallace said. "And at the top of the list was Hiroshima."

The Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall is seen after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Japan, in this photo taken by the U.S. Army in November 1945. U.S. Army/Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

Was it a legitimate military target? "Absolutely. It was about 250,000 people, but there were about 50,000 troops garrisoned there, so it was a legitimate target."

"Surely they realized women and children would not be spared?" Martin asked.

"He basically made the calculation: 'If we go and invade, we're going to kill a lot of Japanese civilians, and we're also going to kill a lot of Americans. Or, we can drop the bomb and just kill the Japanese. It sounds cold-blooded, but that was the calculation."

Simon & Schuster

The bomb weighed 9,000 pounds and was hoisted into the belly of a B-29 flown by Col. Paul Tibbets, who named the plane for his mother, Enola Gay. It took off in the early morning of August 6, 1945, from the island of Tinian, in the northern Marianas. The bomb fell from 30,000 feet to 1,800 feet before detonating.

The co-pilot, Robert Lewis, jotted down perhaps the most succinct and apt description of the moment: "My God, what have we done?"

President Truman was aboard a ship returning from the Potsdam conference when he announced the destruction of Hiroshima: "We are now prepared to destroy more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have in any city," he said.

"He was jubilant about it because he thought, 'Now finally maybe we can end the war and we can save hundreds of thousands of American lives,'" Wallace said.

All that was left standing in Hiroshima were structures built of concrete, and they had been gutted by fire. But the city was off-limits to reporters, until a young correspondent named John Hersey broke through military censorship and wrote probably the most famous magazine article ever in The New Yorker: "Hiroshima" (published August 24, 1946).

Wallace said, "That is the first time that most Americans really found out in graphic detail what it was like to experience the bombing at Ground Zero."

Wallace found out from Hideko Tamura, who was a 10-year-old girl in Hiroshima 75 years ago.

"She sees people incinerated," he recalled. "She sees people who the thermal wind has sucked their eyes out. She sees bodies all over the place. She sees people who've been vaporized, and all that's left is the shadow of where they were against a wall."

Japan did not surrender until three days later, after a second, more powerful bomb (named Fat Man) was dropped on Nagasaki.

Mr. Truman at one point writes, "I think that the flower of American youth is worth a couple of Japanese cities."

World War II, the most terrible in history, was over. Seventy-five years later, a stark truth remains," Wallace said: "A nuclear weapon has been used in warfare only twice, three days apart, and the only country that's ever used it was the United States."

The story of the USS Indianapolis, the most famous shark attack in history

The sinking of the USS Indianapolis resulted in the most famous shark attack event in history. The Indianapolis, CA-35, was a heavy cruiser (often miscalled a battleship in stories) during World War II. In July 1945, it completed a top secret mission to deliver parts of the atomic bomb known as “Little Boy” to the Army Air Force base on the island of Tinian. Because of its mission, the route, radio transmissions, and people knowledgeable about it was kept to an absolute minimum. Tracking of such large ships was done solely on prediction by Command, not verification.

On July 30, 1945, the ship was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine that was known by Naval Intelligence to be operating in the area, but this was not passed on to the Indianapolis Captain (who was later court martialed for failing to zigzag appropriately and ultimately committed suicide in 1968 due to guilt). It fully sank in 12 minutes where approximately 900 of the 1200 crewman went into the water (the other 300 went down with the ship). There were minimal lifeboats and almost no food or water.

On July 31, when the ship was supposed to arrive, the “marker” for it was removed off the Command board as having arrived, without any physical verification. The Port Officer was aware of the overdue ship, but failed to conduct any follow up. Although radio distress signals were sent out during the sinking, and three stations actually received the reports, none followed up on them. One receiving officer was drunk, another had told personnel he was not to be disturbed for any reason, and the third disregarded it as a Japanese trap. As such, the crew was adrift for four days until an aircraft flew over the area and sighted them. Naval Command did not know about the ship’s sinking until survivors were actually spotted by a routine patrol flight.

Once spotted, one of the first responding rescue planes, an amphibious PBY-5A Catalina, attempted to drop life rafts, but had poor success. Upon seeing that survivors were actively being picked off by sharks (one crew reported a shark “twice as big” as a crewmember being kicked away), the pilot disobeyed standing orders to land in open ocean, and landed in the 12 foot seas. The plane taxied around the survivors in an effort to scare away the sharks. They took on 56 survivors (some strapped to the wing with parachute chord), which rendered the plane unflyable. The plane continued to taxi and standby on the water for several hours until the Destroyer USS Cecil J. Doyle arrived, followed by six other ships.

Once all survivors had been rescued, the PBY-5A had to be sunk as it was damaged from the landing and survivors and not able to fly. Over the course of the four days, the crew died off from a combination of exposure, dehydration, saltwater poisoning (crewmembers became disoriented and began to drink the ocean water), and shark attacks. Only 317 crew survived (it was previously reported 316, but Clarence Donner was added in 2017 after confirming he was a survivor). Although the exact numbers are not known, estimates put the total number of crewmen (both live and dead) to be taken by sharks between 60-150.

Oceanic whitetip (Photo courtesy Wikimedia Commons)

Dozens of these were live crewmen. Reports of crewmen screaming and being taken underwater, with blood would rise to the surface along with any lifejacket they had on, were not uncommon over the four days. The predominant shark identified by survivor reports was the oceanic whitetip, but there was a distinct possibility based on later reports from crewmen that tigers were probably also present as well as some “unknown” others (which is highly probable based on the amount of noise and blood in the water). Oceanic whitetips are known for being highly aggressive, especially in numbers and it would not be unheard of for them to attack live people. Tigers are known for this already, so any live crewmembers taken by tigers would not be an unreasonable expectation. Other species of sharks present (blues, mako, etc.) would probably have not been direct attackers, but been present to feed on carcasses and remnants.

Overall, based on the timeframe and reports, there is nothing unbelievable about the numbers of crewmembers taken by sharks, the species of sharks involved, and the behavior of the sharks. The Indianapolis incident is the most famous of shark attack incidents because of the overall story. Due to Naval records not being accurate in how all crewmembers of any naval catastrophe actually die, it is unknown the exact numbers of sailors taken by sharks. However, rough compilations over the years by some Naval historians have estimated the number of military sailors (both live and dead, not including civilians) taken by sharks, by all countries in World War I and World War II, to be approximately 150,000-200,000. These numbers are best guesses by historians, but not able to be substantiated and not involving shark experts (as there really weren’t a whole lot at that time, and those that were had extremely limited data and knowledge).

It was estimated that on average, 10-50 crewmen were taken by sharks per ship going down (this includes dead crewmen killed by something else and then witnessed eaten by a shark). There were an estimated 12,000+ ships sunk between the two wars by all the countries involved. The “total number” also included civilian ships that were forced into military service, submarines, and landing craft. In just WWII alone, the U.S. Merchant Marines lost over 1500 ships. At first the 150-200k seems high. But considering the population of sharks at that time, the number of years included (five years of WWI and six years of WWII), and the many thousands of vessels involved (from all countries), the number does not seem completely unrealistic. In August 2017, the wreckage of the Indianapolis was discovered by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen in the Philippine Sea lying at approximately 18,000 feet deep. The wreckage is well preserved in three pieces on the ocean floor. Last month, July 2019, the remaining 14 living survivors reunited, as they do every year to memorialize the ship, the catastrophe, and their fellow crewmembers.


The Indianapolis is so famous because of the overall story: its role in the atomic bomb, its journey, the circumstances of it being sunk and overdue and no one investigating, and then the four day ordeal with survivors. It is probably one of the most “unique” or unusual maritime disaster stories and involves sharks heavily. So it would be understandable how so many titles and headlines have been given to this incident. But does it warrant “the worst shark attack in history?”

That is a tough one to answer with 100% confidence, since much of the evidence is based on reporting by people who aren’t shark experts and weren’t necessarily paying attention to the sharks, but rather on survival. But we can analyze the known facts and come up with a reasonable analysis. There were on the high end of 150 crew, both live and dead, taken by sharks. Of those less than 50 were live men taken by sharks (based on the firsthand confirmed accounts of “at least a few dozen”), with as low a number as 30. So that now puts us at 30-50 live people attacked by sharks. That’s a substantial number for a singular incident.

The defining factor in this incident vs. many others is time. There were four days for which they were exposed to sharks. Generally speaking, when a ship went down, even in those days, exposure wasn’t for such a long period of time. The Nova Scotia sinking is one of the most comparable maritime disasters. It was off South Africa in the Natal region. The first key thing to note was the time factor, with the Nova Scotia having ships on site for rescue within a day.

Then there is the factor of what shark species are prevalent there. The ship sank at the outer regions of the Oceanic whitetip’s range. Whitetips are probably the best scavengers of all the shark species. Like a hammerhead is specialized for picking up prey that is buried, OWTs are specialized at finding food in large open oceans. They cover a tremendous amount of distance searching for food and they are tuned to pick up long distance sources. If every shark species was to be compared to a land species, the OWT would be like the Polar bear.

Where the Indianapolis sank, the population of OWTs would have been significant. So the quantity of OWTs on the Indianapolis would have been far higher than the Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia would have encountered Tigers, which would have played a much greater factor. But Tigers are not as effective in long range scavenging as OWTs and there wouldn’t have been as many Tigers as there were OWTs. So the number of sharks overall at the Nova Scotia would most likely not have been anywhere near the numbers at the Indianapolis. The number of sharks at the Indianapolis are estimated, based on reports by both the crew and the PBY that came in, to be over 100. The OWTs at the Nova Scotia would probably not have been as high as that, with a handful or more most likely, and total number of sharks a few dozen. In fact, the hundreds of bodies washing ashore as long as a week later tells me the shark numbers and species were not comparable to the Indianapolis.

There is also another maritime disaster that could also challenge the “worst shark attack in history.” The Dona Paz, a Philippine ferry, collided with an oil tanker in the Tablas Strait, a heavy shark area. A total of over 4100 people were lost and only 24 survivors. Sharks were reported to be prevalent in that incident as well. However, again the factors were different than the Indianapolis. A rescue ship was on site within a couple hours and another key factor was that there were thousands of gallons of oil in the water and on fire. The survivors didn’t report any sharks, but later sharks had fed on a number of the bodies. Because most of the victims appeared to be burned, sharks attacking live people was minimal based on the physical evidence found.

So in summary to answer the question…there is no hard evidence to say with absolution on any of this and any answer is based on deductive analysis. But given the exposure time, location, species involved, and miscellaneous circumstances, the Indianapolis with 30-50 live crewmen attacked by sharks would be, based on my personal analysis, justified to be called the “worst shark attack event in history.”

The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis

Sometimes a movie can provide a history lesson in its story arc—an event that few in the audience are familiar with. Such is the case in the motion picture Jaws. We all remember the summer blockbuster from 1975 that scared us straight out of the ocean and introduced us to Quint, the salty sailor hired to hunt down the toothy predator that was menacing swimmers on Amity Island.

During a moment of gravitas, miles from shore aboard the fishing vessel Orca, Quint explains the origin story of his nautical tattoo. He reveals to the others that he was a survivor of the USS Indianapolis, the heavy cruiser that shipped the first atomic bomb to the tiny island of Tinian and was subsequently sunk by two Japanese torpedoes. It was a bleak scene steeped in maritime tragedy.

What distinguished this ship from any other at that time was its objective. In late July 1945, USS Indianapolis had been on a special secret mission, delivering parts of the first atomic bomb to the Pacific Island of Tinian, where American B-29 bombers were based. With its task completed, on the night of July 30, 1945, two weeks before the end of the war, while sailing from Guam to Leyte, the USS Indianapolis was torpedoed twice by a Japanese submarine. The crew of 1,199 men ended up in the waters of the Pacific. Accounts of the disaster are preserved in oral histories of those who survived. One man, Captain Charles B. McVay, who commanded the ship, remembers it this way:

On Sunday night, the 29th of July . . . approximately five minutes after midnight [30 July], I was thrown from my emergency cabin bunk on the bridge by a very violent explosion followed shortly thereafter by another explosion. I went to the bridge and noticed, in my emergency cabin and charthouse that there was quite a bit of acrid white smoke. I couldn’t see anything. . . . I asked the Officer of the Deck [senior officer on duty] if he had had any reports. He said No, Sir. I have lost all communications. Within another two or three minutes the executive officer [second in command on the ship] came up . . . and said, We are definitely going down and I suggest that we abandon ship.”

The first torpedo struck just after midnight on July 30, 1945. The second torpedo fired from the Japanese submarine almost tore the ship in two. As fires raged below, the vessel began to list onto its side. Then, the order came to abandon ship. Approximately 900 sailors, survivors of the initial torpedo attack, were left drifting in groups in the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. Beneath them, a far more sinister danger was lurking. Hundreds of sharks, drawn by the carnage of the disaster, moved toward the survivors.

After feeding on the dead from the explosions, the sharks turned their attention toward those still alive, bobbing in the large swells of the ocean surface. Some of the men pounded the water, kicking and yelling when the sharks approached. Many decided that grouping together was their best defense but with each attack came clouds of blood in the water followed by more screaming and splashing which only encouraged more sharks to strike.

Desperate to survive, and with no drinking water and many hallucinating, survivors were finally spotted days later by a U.S. Navy plane. Shortly after 11 a.m. on the fourth day, the survivors were accidentally discovered by Lt. Wilbur C. Gwinn, flying his PV-1 Ventura bomber on routine antisubmarine patrol. He radioed his base at Peleliu and sent out the alert, “many men in the water.”

A PBY seaplane under the command of Lt. R. Adrian Marks took off to provide assistance and report on their status. En route to the scene, Marks overflew the destroyer USS Cecil Doyle (DD-368) and alerted her captain of the emergency. The captain of the Doyle, on his own authority, decided to reroute to the scene. Arriving hours ahead of the Doyle, Marks’s crew dropped rubber rafts and supplies as they witnessed continuing shark attacks. Disregarding orders not to land at sea, the pilot touched down and began taxiing to pick up survivors.

As darkness set in, and as Marks waited for rescue vessels, he pulled men from the water into his aircraft. When the plane’s fuselage was at maximum capacity, survivors were tied to the wings with parachute cord. The pilot and his crew rescued a total of 56 men. Once signaled, a total of seven Navy ships converged on the site and rescued the remaining men. Only 317 sailors survived.

To learn more about the history of the USS Indianapolis visit the Naval History and Heritage Command website.

Those known to have served with

during the Second World War 1939-1945.

  • Abel Cecil George. Dvr.
  • Airey Cyril. S/Sgt
  • Alecock Frederick Derrick. Dvr. (d.15th Dec 1944)
  • Allen Herbert George. Pte.
  • Allen Joseph. Sgt.
  • Andrew George Simpson. Sgt (d.1st Jun 1945)
  • Andrewartha Dennis. Pte.
  • Andrews Walter Robert. Dvr.
  • Anthony Robert Cummings. Private (d.17th June 1940)
  • Aquilina Raymond.
  • Argent Ernest. Drvr.
  • Arnold F.. Driver (d.10th May 1942)
  • Ascough George Richard Nicholson. Mjr (Act. Col.)
  • Ash Arthur William.
  • Ash Charles. driver
  • Ashby Charles Henry.
  • Ashby Frank Stephen.
  • Ashelford Cyril James. Dvr.
  • Ashelford Cyril James. Dvr.
  • Ashfield William John. Cpl.
  • Atkinson Cyril George. Pte.
  • Austin James. Pte.
  • Ball Leslie. Cpl.
  • Banks George. Lt-Col
  • Barham Henry William . Lt.
  • Barrett Royden Whittaker. Cpl.
  • Bass Edwin John. Cpl.
  • Bates Leslie. L/Cpl.
  • Beadleson Cyril Bernard. Drvr. (d.1st November 1941)
  • Beck Robert. Dvr.
  • Beckett George. A/Sgt.
  • Beliskey H.. Pte.
  • Bell Clarence. Cpl
  • Bending John Levi.
  • Bennett Frank John.
  • Bennett William Millar. Dvr.
  • Bethell Robert Henry. Pte.
  • Bigg Albert Andrew J.. Dvr.
  • Bigwood Ernest George. Dvr.
  • Bishop FS.
  • Bisseker EJ. Cpl.
  • Black John Francis. L/Cpl.
  • Bleazard H. T.Mjr.
  • Bluett Denis Guy. Lt.
  • Boast CR.
  • Boden Stanley Walter. Dvr.
  • Boldsworth Charles Frederick. Dvr.
  • Booth RB.
  • Bosi John. Dvr. (d.2nd August 1944)
  • Bowen Thomas Edward Morse. CQMS.
  • Bowen Thomas Edward Morse. WO2.
  • Braithwaite George.
  • Bramham George Robert. Sgt.
  • Briggs Reginald John. Drvr.
  • Bright John William. Pte
  • Bright Thomas. Driver
  • Briley John.
  • Broadway Ronald Robert. Pte.
  • Brough Thomas Henry. Pte. (d.19th July 1944)
  • Brown William Arthur. Pte. (d.6th Nov 1941)
  • Buckley Albert Henry.
  • Buckley William. Dvr.
  • Budd Arthur Henry. (d.1st August 1942)
  • Burnett Alexander. Sgt.
  • Burrows George Frederick Thomas. Sergeant (d.5th July 1941)
  • Bursell Arthur Leslie. Dvr.
  • Burton Frederick Macdonald. W/Sgt.
  • Butcher Victor James. Sgt.
  • Butler John Tyson. Drvr.
  • Butt Roy. Dvr.
  • Cain Charles. Pte.
  • Campbell Christopher Joseph. Pte.
  • Carter Albert . Dvr. (d.27th Mar 1945)
  • Carter Frank. Dvr.
  • Cashmore Bernard. Dvr.
  • Castel George Farquar.
  • Catchpole Cyril.
  • Catley Alfred. Pte.
  • Chapple George William. Pte
  • Charlton JH.
  • Cheese Arthur William. Sgt.
  • Cheesman Cyril Tracy. L/Cpl
  • Christie Atherton Ffolliot Powell. Staff Sgt.
  • Clark Albert Arthur. Cpl.
  • Clark Frederick Arthur.
  • Clarke Leslie George. Pte.
  • Codling James William. Dvr.
  • Collingwood Sidney Derek. Cpl.
  • Colthorpe Cecil Walter. Cpl.
  • Compton Henry Thomas.
  • Connelly Charles Edward. Pte. (d.16th Jan 1942)
  • Cooper Basil Seymour. Mjr.
  • Cooper Edgar Roy. Pte. (d.12th Feb 1944)
  • Cowing Charles Henry. Cpl.
  • Cox Leopold.
  • Cox Robert Hutchinson.
  • Criddle Francis. L/Cpl.
  • Crockford Thomas Henry. Pte.
  • Crosbie WA.
  • Crowshaw Ronald. Cpl.
  • Cullen Maurice Patrick. Sgt.
  • Cumming David . Cpl.
  • Cushnie William. Dvr.
  • Daniel Martin Charles Campbell. Capt. (d.24th Sep 1942)
  • Daniels Samuel Clifford. Pte.
  • Dare RJ.
  • Dargue Thomas. Drvr.
  • Darling James George Robert. Sgt
  • Davies Melvyn William. Dvr.
  • Davis Harold.
  • Dellar Douglas William.
  • Denness Charles Arthur. Sgt.
  • Denny Alfred Frank. Pte.
  • Dilks Verdun Bramley. Pte.
  • Dimmer RF.
  • Dobney John Gordon. S.Sgt. (d.11th Aug 1943)
  • Dobson JT.
  • Dore Leslie Robert. Drvr/Cpl
  • Drake Leslie Claude. Dvr.
  • Driscoll Jeremiah. Drvr.
  • Dukes John.
  • Dukes John.
  • Dukes John. Cpl.
  • Duncan Ian Henry.
  • Duncan James W.. Pte.
  • Duncan William Gillespie. Pte.
  • Dunnage Reg Arthur. L/Cpl
  • Durman P.
  • Earnshaw George. Dvr.
  • Edington John Thomas Andrew. C/Sgt.
  • Edward W H. Private
  • Edwards Bill Vernon. Pte.
  • Elliott R.. CQMS (d. )
  • Ellis James Edward.
  • Emery Albert Henry.
  • Etheridge E.
  • Evans Albert Edward. Pte. (d.17th June 1940)
  • Evans L.
  • Everett Patrick Denis. WO.
  • Evison Harry. Pte.
  • Farmer Cornelius. Dvr.
  • Farmer Frank. Pte.
  • Fenton Fred. Cpl.
  • Fidom John. Dvr.
  • Fielden Harry. Pte.
  • Findon William Jeffrey. Pte.
  • Fletcher James. Dvr.
  • Fletcher James. Staff/Sgt.
  • Fogg Edward George.
  • Fountain Gerald. Dvr.
  • Fox Sidney. Mechanised Sergeant Major
  • Francis John Charles. Sgt.
  • Fuller G. H.. Dvr.
  • Gale Authur Patrick. Capt. (d.29th May 1940)
  • Galliers Charles Henry Francis. Cpl.
  • Gander D.
  • Gannon Charles Edward. Sgt.
  • Gannon John. Driver (d.7th February 1945)
  • Gartenfeld Desmond Norman.
  • Gee Charles. L/Cpl.
  • George John William.
  • Gibbs William Alexander. Drvr.
  • Gilbert Frederick John. Dvr.
  • Gilbert George Alfred.
  • Gill .
  • Gill Harry. Sgt.
  • Goodwin James.
  • Goodyer-Pain F. C.J.. Maj.
  • Gorman John Charles. Dvr.
  • Gough Kenneth Roy. 2nd Lt.
  • Green Ralph Kent. A/Maj.
  • Greenall G.
  • Greenfield SJ.
  • Griffiths Edward Charles. S/Sgt
  • Grove Alexander Norman Walter. Sgt.
  • Grover Alfred Henry . Drvr. (d.7th Sep 1944)
  • Guest Cyril Jack.
  • Hague Alexander Gilchrist. Cpl.
  • Hall J.
  • Hall Samuel Robert. Capt.
  • Hallam Gilbert Dennis. Sgt.
  • Hann Edwin George. Sgt.
  • Hanner Paul. Cpl.
  • Harland John Charles. Major.
  • Harris R.
  • Haskell Thomas Edward. Dvr. (d.20th Mar 1941)
  • Haswell Sam Crossley. Pte.
  • Hayes Jimmy. Cpl.
  • Haynes Edward Aurther. Pte. (d.6th July 1942)
  • Hayward Roy.
  • Hearnden Cecil. Pte.
  • Heaton Robert. Sgt.
  • Heaven Frank Gordon. Pte.
  • Heinink Anthony Frank. Pte. (d.5th August 1943)
  • Henderson Peter. Pte.
  • Heseltine . Sgt.
  • Heslop Thomas Waugh. L/Cpl. (d. 28/3/1944)
  • Hewer-Hewitt Alexander Robert Clifford. Maj.
  • Heywood Vincent. L/Cpl
  • Higgins John Arthur. Pte.
  • Hilton Jack. Pte.
  • Hodgson George Caleb. Pte. (d.2nd Jun 1941)
  • Hogan John Arthur. Pte. (d.3rd June 1944)
  • Holt Bernard Arnold.
  • Hope Albert. Dvr. (d.15th Sep 1944)
  • Hopkins JH.
  • Hopton Henry George . Pte.
  • Horsman Horace.
  • Howel .
  • Hughes John Nursall. Pte.
  • Hughes John.
  • Hughes Wilfred Henry. Pte.
  • Hunt George Derrick.
  • Hunt Wilfred Henry. Cpl.
  • Hunter Ian Bruce. Lt Col.
  • Huntley George E.. Capt.
  • Hynds Herbert John.
  • Ireland Thomas Patrick. Dvr. (d.11th Aug 1944)
  • Ireland Thomas Patrick. Drvr. (d.11th Aug 1944)
  • Isherwood George Wallace. Sgt.
  • Jackson James William.
  • Jacobs Joseph.
  • James Llew.
  • James Llew.
  • James Norman Henry. Cpl.
  • James William Griffith.
  • James William Griffith. Sgt.
  • Jamieson David Leckie. Pte.
  • Jeffery Roy.
  • Jenkins William Rees. SQMS. (d.17th June 1940)
  • Johnston David Ballantyne. Dvr.
  • Jones Harold. Dvr.
  • Jones John Victor. L/Cpl.
  • Jones Samuel Emlyn. Cpl,
  • Kadigawe Kanchana Senerat. Pte.
  • Kauffman Hyman.
  • Kay PP. L.Sgt.
  • Kearey Frederick Charles. Pte.
  • Kelly Thomas. L/Cpl (d.11th Jun 1940)
  • Kennett Arthur. Cpl.
  • Keogan .
  • Kerr J.
  • Kershaw Neil Percy. Dvr.
  • King Herbert. Sgt.
  • King Reginald.
  • Lambert Stanley. Dvr.
  • Landy L. T.Capt
  • Larkin Martin Stanley. L/Cpl.
  • Lawrence Cyril.
  • Lawson Joseph.
  • Lay William.
  • Lee Bob.
  • Lee Jack. Cpl.
  • Levy John. Pte. (d.11th April 1945)
  • Lindsay J.
  • Little John.
  • Lody Anthony. L/Cpl. (d.2nd Apr 1945)
  • Longhurst Kenneth Bernard. QMS.
  • Lowe Clifford Salisbury. Pte
  • Lowe William.
  • Lowing William. Cpt.
  • Lyde Bernard.
  • Lyle George Edward. Cpl.
  • Lyons M.
  • Mabb Richard J.. L/Cpl.
  • Mace Samual Robert. Dvr.
  • MacKenzie Francis Walter. Pte.
  • Maguire H.
  • Mahoney Patrick.
  • Manchester Charles. Sgt Mjr.
  • Martin Albert. Dvr.
  • Martin Bill. Pte.
  • Martin William. Private
  • Mason CR.
  • Matthews Sydney. (d.15th Feb 1942)
  • Mawer Jesse Frederick. Lt/Capt
  • May Frank William John. Mjr.
  • Maynard Wally.
  • McArthur . Cpl.
  • Mccallen Michael William.
  • McCormick Ronald. Dvr.
  • McCulloch James George.
  • McDougall Charles. Driver
  • Mcguire JJ.
  • McLewin Douglas Gerald. Capt.
  • McManus John Wiliam. Pte.
  • Mead Robert Lional. Private (d.2004)
  • Meagher Bernard Peter. WO1.
  • Megicks Frederick James Rhys. Sgt
  • Mills Norman. Cpl.
  • Moore Harold Arthur. Lt. (d.22nd Jan 1945)
  • Morgan GH.
  • Morgan Leonard Raymond. S/Sgt.
  • Morris Clifford Watson. Dvr.
  • Morris Reginald William. L/Cpl
  • Morrisroe Luke. Dvr.
  • Moulton Frederick. L/Cpl.
  • Muirhead Hugh White. L/Cpl.
  • Murphy Patrick Joseph. Drvr. (d.12th March 1943)
  • Nicholls David. Mjr.
  • Nicholls John William. Pte. (d.13th January 1943)
  • Nimmo John Taylor.
  • Nixon .
  • Norfield WJ. Dvr.
  • Normoyle Daniel. WO1 (d.21st July 1940)
  • Nunn Albert Hockley. Drvr.
  • Nuttall Harry. L/Cpl.
  • Oliver Douglas Phillip. Cpl.
  • Orton Arthur. Cpl. (d.16th July 1945)
  • Outram Jack. Driver
  • Owen Edward. Dvr.
  • Owen George. Dvr. (d.23rd April 1945)
  • Parker James. Driver
  • Parkinson George. Dvr.
  • Parkinson Rex.
  • Parratt H.. Cpl.
  • Pascoe Arthur Sidney. Pte.
  • Passmore Arthur Victor. Pte. (d.26th April 1941)
  • Paterson William. Major
  • Payne . Pte.
  • Penfold Edward. Cpl. (d.17th Jun 1940)
  • Penny G.
  • Perkins Cecil Roy.
  • Perkins James. Sgt.
  • Perris George Albert. Capt. (d.7th Dec 1941)
  • Pettit Henry William John. L/Cpl.
  • Pinder Arthur. Dvr.
  • Pinnell Frederick J.. (d.17th July 1941)
  • Pinnell Frederick J.. (d.17th July 1941)
  • Player Gwilym Ernest.
  • Pollard Frederick James. Dvr.
  • Pope Frederick George. Pte. (d.2nd July 1941)
  • Porte John.
  • Powell Alfred James. Pte. (d.5th Dec 1941)
  • Powell Alfred James. Pte. (d.5th December 1941)
  • Price Fred J.. Cpl. (d.26th October 1942)
  • Price Trevor Glyn. (d.17th June 1940)
  • Price William Henry. Pte.
  • Purchase George. Pte.
  • Purnell Edward. Pte.
  • Rae Patrick John. Dvr
  • Ray Stanley. CSM.
  • Read Christopher Harold. Dvr.
  • Redpath Walter Thomas. LCpl.
  • Reeves PO.
  • Revill Horace. Pte.
  • Reynolds Norman Frank. Drvr.
  • Richmand Frank. Drvr.
  • Rigby Thomas. Driver
  • Rippin Douglas Haig. Dvr.
  • Roberts Cyril Edward. Capt.
  • Roberts Herbert Leslie. Mjr.
  • Robertson John Dick. Dvr.
  • Robinson Fredrick James.
  • Robinson Jack. Dvr.
  • Roome Charles William George. Pte. (d.9th February 1942)
  • Rootes William Frank. Pte.
  • Rout Gordon Henry.
  • Rowland H.. Cpl.
  • Rowlands Bertie John.
  • Rudd Alfred. Pte.
  • Ruscoe Kenneth Samuel. Gnr.
  • Rush Frederick.
  • Ryles George Frederick. Sgt.
  • Sadler Joyce. Pte.
  • Sales Cyril. Dvr.
  • Sampson Walter Ryecroft. Sgt.
  • Sanders Harold. Dvr.
  • Saunders Arthur. Dvr.
  • Saunders Charles Richard. L/Cpl.
  • Savage Richard George. Pte.
  • Scott Leslie Gilbert. Dvr. (d.29th Nov 1941)
  • Screech-Powell Edwin Patrick. Pte.
  • Seale John. L/Cpl
  • Sheen Joe. Dvr.
  • Shepherd Ronald Frederick. Pte.
  • Sheppard Jack Percival. Pte.
  • Shone Neville Spencer. Capt.
  • Shotter Ralph William John. L/Cpl. (d.17th Jun 1940)
  • Shubsachs Ezra. L/Cpl.
  • Sinderson John. Dvr.
  • Skerritt Edgar Maitland. Dvr.
  • Slight Thomas William. Pte.
  • Smallwood William Henry. RSM
  • Smith GG.
  • Smith HE.
  • Smith Leslie Arthur. Pte.
  • Smith Noel Stephen. Sgt.Mjr.
  • Smith Reginald Ernest. Dvr.
  • Smout PA.
  • Somerfield Leonard. Dvr. (d.2nd June 1940)
  • Sossick Janes Hercules. S/Sgt.
  • Spavins Albert Edward. SQMS
  • Spencer R. Dvr.
  • Stammers Arthur Huggins . Dvr. (d.29th May 1940)
  • Staples Jim. Capt.
  • Stewart JB.
  • Stewart Thomas. Pte.
  • Still James. Drvr. (d.16th April 1945)
  • Stockton Thomas Arthur. Sgt.
  • Sturman Cecil Douglas. Cpl.
  • Sutcliffe Geoffrey. Cpl
  • Swan Alexander Fulton. L/Cpl.
  • Sweeney Francis Kitchener. L/Cpl.
  • Symonds Jack. Dvr.
  • Taylor J. A..
  • Taylor Leonard Henry. Pte.
  • Taylor Robert Gladstone. Lt.
  • Thackray Percy. Corporal
  • Thackray Percy. Cpl.
  • Thomas Victor Albert. Pte.
  • Thomas Walter. Pte.
  • Thompson Leonard. Pte. (d.29th May - 2nd June 1940)
  • Thurlow Walter William. Dvr. (d.2nd March 1944)
  • Tonlinson Reginald Samuel. Cpl.
  • Tossell Richard George.
  • Treavis Albert Louvain. S/Sgt.
  • Troutt Henry William. Dvr.
  • Tuck Harry Arthur. Pte.
  • Tucker Reginald Martyn. Lt.
  • Turner Albert. Pte.
  • Turner PR.
  • Turner William John Thomas. Sgt.
  • Tysoe-Smith E.. Cpl.
  • Tyson John. Drvr.
  • Unger Cyril George. Dvr.
  • Upton James. Dvr. (d.27th May 1940)
  • Usher Harry. Dvr. (d.31st Mar 1945)
  • Vaughan David Elwyn. Cpl (d.14th Aug 1940)
  • Voase Les.
  • Wainwright Harry. (d.18th Dec 1943)
  • Wakelin RT.
  • Walker Harry. Pte.
  • Wanaguru P.. Pte.
  • Wardle Nornan R..
  • Warren Edmund R.A.. Dvr.
  • Watkins S.
  • Watson Reginald Herbert.
  • Watts Wilfred Charles. Sgt.
  • Weeks Harry John. Pte. (d.4th Aug 1943)
  • Wenham Leonard John Albert. Corporal
  • Weston Leonard. Capt. (d.13th Feb 1942)
  • Wharmby Harold. Pte.
  • Whitelock Alfred James. L/Cpl.
  • Whiting Richard Henry James. (d.17th Sept 1945)
  • Whyteside James Albert. L/Cpl.
  • Wickham Albert Stanley. Pte.
  • Wightman William P. K.. Pte. (d.28th Jan 1947)
  • Wilby George. Drvr.
  • Wilde John. L/Cpl.
  • Wilde N.
  • Wildes James Thomas. Dvr.
  • Wilkinson Ronald Hubert. Sgt.
  • Williams Frank Patrick.
  • Williams Robert John. Staff Sargeant
  • Williams William Morris. Sgt. (d.21st July 1946)
  • Williamson John Derek. Cpl.
  • Wilson Martin Sidney.
  • Winn William Edward.
  • Winning Alfred Thomas. Pte.
  • Wodhams Horace Edward . Capt.
  • Wooley-Lane Philip J L . Lieutenant-Colonel
  • Worthington R.
  • Wray Arthur Albert Philip. Pte.
  • Wright John Coyle. Dvr. (d.21st Sep 1943)
  • Wyman Fredrick . Corporal
  • Wynn-Werninck Willliam. Mjr.
  • Yates John. Pte.

The names on this list have been submitted by relatives, friends, neighbours and others who wish to remember them, if you have any names to add or any recollections or photos of those listed, please Add a Name to this List

29 June 1945 - History

Iowa 85 pct vs 98 ave. Illinois 89 pct vs 89 ave.

Soy 44 pct planted vs 61 ave.

Iowa and Illinois both 40 pct planted vs 83 and 53 pct ave.

Spring wheat 79 pct planted vs 86 ave.

Winter wheat rated 31 pct good equal to last week with 42 pct poor,up 1.





Talk of China canceling 3 bean cargos out of Brazil pressuring July beans Probably did more than that.

Ultimately this is not an "export thing" . it will be a "domestic crush" thing.

Bids for soybeans are in a bit of flux tonight as Cargil went to the Nov. It was one of the most unusual days most of us have seen in the soybean market. I was out of town this afternoon so running late this evening. FYI many quote systems have had problems the last couple of days also. This is not a tradable market for anyone involved. And it will probably get worse. Dean

-Old crop corn sales woefully less than "needed"
-Soybean sales solid - especially new crop
-Soybean meal sales strongly outpace "needed" levels again
-Old crop wheat exports may still fall short of projection - solid new crop sales

Soybeans are now bid off of the August (Q) Cedar made the move this am and elevators will follow shortly. The move took about 25 cents off the nearby basis. Movement while not heavy has picked up especially for the June slot. Bean supply will be tight but not today. Traer has recieved 2.5 inches of rain the last few days.

From Cargil - Cedar Rapids

We will begin probing back at CR East starting Wed, May 22 nd. We are extending unloading hours this week Wed (5/22 nd ) – Friday (5/24 th ) to 7a-8p.

Note: Cargil Soybean Plants and elevators are now bidding vs the August. They have taken approx 25 cents off the basis.

Crop Progress: 71% planted vs 79% ave19% emerged vs 46% ave

24% planted vs 42% ave 3% emerged vs 14 % ave

USDA Aug Beans … 42.6 bpa, production 3.255 bil

Subject: Floor Comment -- 10:20 am





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History's Worst Software Bugs

To revist this article, visit My Profile, then View saved stories.

To revist this article, visit My Profile, then View saved stories.

Last month automaker Toyota announced a recall of 160,000 of its Prius hybrid vehicles following reports of vehicle warning lights illuminating for no reason, and cars' gasoline engines stalling unexpectedly. But unlike the large-scale auto recalls of years past, the root of the Prius issue wasn't a hardware problem – it was a programming error in the smart car's embedded code. The Prius had a software bug.

With that recall, the Prius joined the ranks of the buggy computer – a club that began in 1945 when engineers found a moth in Panel F, Relay #70 of the Harvard Mark II system.The computer was running a test of its multiplier and adder when the engineers noticed something was wrong. The moth was trapped, removed and taped into the computer's logbook with the words: "first actual case of a bug being found."

Sixty years later, computer bugs are still with us, and show no sign of going extinct. As the line between software and hardware blurs, coding errors are increasingly playing tricks on our daily lives. Bugs don't just inhabit our operating systems and applications – today they lurk within our cell phones and our pacemakers, our power plants and medical equipment. And now, in our cars.

It's all too easy to come up with a list of bugs that have wreaked havoc. It's harder to rate their severity. Which is worse – a security vulnerability that's exploited by a computer worm to shut down the internet for a few days or a typo that triggers a day-long crash of the nation's phone system? The answer depends on whether you want to make a phone call or check your e-mail.

Many people believe the worst bugs are those that cause fatalities. To be sure, there haven't been many, but cases like the Therac-25 are widely seen as warnings against the widespread deployment of software in safety critical applications. Experts who study such systems, though, warn that even though the software might kill a few people, focusing on these fatalities risks inhibiting the migration of technology into areas where smarter processing is sorely needed. In the end, they say, the lack of software might kill more people than the inevitable bugs.

What seems certain is that bugs are here to stay. Here, in chronological order, is the Wired News list of the 10 worst software bugs of all time … so far.

July 28, 1962 – Mariner I space probe. A bug in the flight software for the Mariner 1 causes the rocket to divert from its intended path on launch. Mission control destroys the rocket over the Atlantic Ocean. The investigation into the accident discovers that a formula written on paper in pencil was improperly transcribed into computer code, causing the computer to miscalculate the rocket's trajectory.

1982 – Soviet gas pipeline. Operatives working for the Central Intelligence Agency allegedly (.pdf) plant a bug in a Canadian computer system purchased to control the trans-Siberian gas pipeline. The Soviets had obtained the system as part of a wide-ranging effort to covertly purchase or steal sensitive U.S. technology. The CIA reportedly found out about the program and decided to make it backfire with equipment that would pass Soviet inspection and then fail once in operation. The resulting event is reportedly the largest non-nuclear explosion in the planet's history.

1985-1987 – Therac-25 medical accelerator. A radiation therapy device malfunctions and delivers lethal radiation doses at several medical facilities. Based upon a previous design, the Therac-25 was an "improved" therapy system that could deliver two different kinds of radiation: either a low-power electron beam (beta particles) or X-rays. The Therac-25's X-rays were generated by smashing high-power electrons into a metal target positioned between the electron gun and the patient. A second "improvement" was the replacement of the older Therac-20's electromechanical safety interlocks with software control, a decision made because software was perceived to be more reliable.

What engineers didn't know was that both the 20 and the 25 were built upon an operating system that had been kludged together by a programmer with no formal training. Because of a subtle bug called a "race condition," a quick-fingered typist could accidentally configure the Therac-25 so the electron beam would fire in high-power mode but with the metal X-ray target out of position. At least five patients die others are seriously injured.

1988 – Buffer overflow in Berkeley Unix finger daemon. The first internet worm (the so-called Morris Worm) infects between 2,000 and 6,000 computers in less than a day by taking advantage of a buffer overflow. The specific code is a function in the standard input/output library routine called gets() designed to get a line of text over the network. Unfortunately, gets() has no provision to limit its input, and an overly large input allows the worm to take over any machine to which it can connect.

Programmers respond by attempting to stamp out the gets() function in working code, but they refuse to remove it from the C programming language's standard input/output library, where it remains to this day.

1988-1996 – Kerberos Random Number Generator. The authors of the Kerberos security system neglect to properly "seed" the program's random number generator with a truly random seed. As a result, for eight years it is possible to trivially break into any computer that relies on Kerberos for authentication. It is unknown if this bug was ever actually exploited.

January 15, 1990 – AT&T Network Outage. A bug in a new release of the software that controls AT&T's #4ESS long distance switches causes these mammoth computers to crash when they receive a specific message from one of their neighboring machines – a message that the neighbors send out when they recover from a crash.

One day a switch in New York crashes and reboots, causing its neighboring switches to crash, then their neighbors' neighbors, and so on. Soon, 114 switches are crashing and rebooting every six seconds, leaving an estimated 60 thousand people without long distance service for nine hours. The fix: engineers load the previous software release.

1993 – Intel Pentium floating point divide. A silicon error causes Intel's highly promoted Pentium chip to make mistakes when dividing floating-point numbers that occur within a specific range. For example, dividing 4195835.0/3145727.0 yields 1.33374 instead of 1.33382, an error of 0.006 percent. Although the bug affects few users, it becomes a public relations nightmare. With an estimated 3 million to 5 million defective chips in circulation, at first Intel only offers to replace Pentium chips for consumers who can prove that they need high accuracy eventually the company relents and agrees to replace the chips for anyone who complains. The bug ultimately costs Intel $475 million.

1995/1996 – The Ping of Death. A lack of sanity checks and error handling in the IP fragmentation reassembly code makes it possible to crash a wide variety of operating systems by sending a malformed "ping" packet from anywhere on the internet. Most obviously affected are computers running Windows, which lock up and display the so-called "blue screen of death" when they receive these packets. But the attack also affects many Macintosh and Unix systems as well.

June 4, 1996 – Ariane 5 Flight 501. Working code for the Ariane 4 rocket is reused in the Ariane 5, but the Ariane 5's faster engines trigger a bug in an arithmetic routine inside the rocket's flight computer. The error is in the code that converts a 64-bit floating-point number to a 16-bit signed integer. The faster engines cause the 64-bit numbers to be larger in the Ariane 5 than in the Ariane 4, triggering an overflow condition that results in the flight computer crashing.

29 June 1945 - History

With her brother on her back a war weary Korean girl tiredly trudges
by a stalled M-26 tank, at Haengju, Korea., 06/09/1951
National Archives

Korean War Timeline - Year 1951

January 4, 1951
CCF & NKPA retake Seoul.

January 8 - 24, 1951
Ridgway revitalizes 8th Army, halts retreat and stabilizes the defense.

January 13 - 17, 1951
U.N. Resolution offers China a peace plan. China rejects.

January 25, 1951
U.N. forces initiate a limited offensive.

February 1951
Execution of 800 to 1,000 villagers at Kochang.

March 14, 1951
8th Army attacks and retakes Seoul.

April 11, 1951
President Truman sends MacArthur into retirement.

April 19, 1951
MacArthur says good-bye and delivers his Old Soldiers Don't Die address to a joint session of Congress.

April 22, 1951
Chinese drive U.N. forces south of 38th parallel.

May 10, 1951
Second Chinese offensive beaten back.

End of June 1951
Battle line stabilize near 38th parallel.

July 8, 1951
Liaison officers of both coalitions meet.

July 10, 1951
Negotiations between U.N. forces and Communists begin at Kaesong.

July 10, 1951 - July 27, 1953
Negotiating while fighting. "Stalemate"

August 31 - November 12, 1951
8th Army's Autumn Offensive.

End of October 1951
In accord with the Communists, the truce negotiations are moved to a more secure area, the village of Panmunjom.

Watch the video: Prince Bernhard visits Alkmaar